Market liquidity and funding liquidity by Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Pedersen, Lasse Heje
Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity∗
Markus K. Brunnermeier†
Princeton University
Lasse Heje Pedersen‡
New York University
This version: February 2007
Abstract
We provide a model that links an asset’s market liquidity — i.e., the ease with which
it is traded — and traders’ funding liquidity — i.e., the ease with which they can ob-
tain funding. Traders provide market liquidity, and their ability to do so depends on
their availability of funding. Conversely, traders’ funding, i.e., their capital and the mar-
gins they are charged, depend on the assets’ market liquidity. We show that, under
certain conditions, margins are destabilizing and market liquidity and funding liquidity
are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals. The model explains the empirically
documented features that market liquidity (i) can suddenly dry up, (ii) has commonality
across securities, (iii) is related to volatility, (iv) is subject to “flight to quality”, and (v)
comoves with the market, and it provides new testable predictions.
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Trading requires capital. When a trader — e.g. a dealer, hedge fund, or investment
bank — buys a security, he can use the security as collateral and borrow against it, but he
cannot borrow the entire price. The difference between the security’s price and collateral
value, denoted as the margin, must be financed with the trader’s own capital. Similarly,
shortselling requires capital in the form of a margin; it does not free up capital. Therefore,
the total margin on all positions cannot exceed a trader’s capital at any time.
Our model shows that the funding of traders affects — and is affected by — market
liquidity in a profound way. When funding liquidity is tight, traders become reluctant to
take on positions, especially “capital intensive” positions in high-margin securities. This
lowers market liquidity, leading to higher volatility. Further, under certain conditions, low
future market liquidity increases the risk of financing a trade, thus increasing margins.
Based on the links between funding and market liquidity, we provide a unified explanation
for the main empirical features of market liquidity. In particular, our model implies that
market liquidity (i) can suddenly dry up, (ii) has commonality across securities, (iii) is related
to volatility, (iv) is subject to “flight to liquidity,” and (v) comoves with the market. The
model has several new testable implications that link margins and dealer funding to market
liquidity: We predict that (i) a shock to speculators’ capital is a state variable affecting market
liquidity and risk premia, (ii) a reduction in capital reduces market liquidity, especially if
capital is already low (a non-linear effect) and for high-margin securities, (iii) margins increase
in illiquidity if the fundamental value is difficult to determine, and (iv) speculators’ returns
are negatively skewed (even if they trade securities without skewness in the fundamentals).
Our model is similar in spirit to Grossman and Miller (1988) with the added feature that
speculators face the real-world funding constraint discussed above. In our model, different
customers have offsetting demand shocks, but arrive sequentially to the market. This creates
a temporary order imbalance. Speculators smooth price fluctuations, thus providing market
liquidity. Speculators finance their trades through collateralized borrowing from financiers
who set the margins to control their value-at-risk (VaR). We derive the competitive equilib-
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rium of the model and explore its liquidity implications. We define market liquidity as the
difference between the transaction price and the fundamental value, and funding liquidity as
a speculator’s scarcity (or shadow cost) of capital.
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Figure 1: Margins for S&P500 Futures. The figure shows margin requirements on S&P500
futures for members of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange as a fraction of the value of the underlying
S&P500 index multiplied by the size of the contract. (Initial or maintenance margins are the same
for members.) Each dot represents a change in the dollar margin.
We first analyze the properties of margins. We show that margins can increase in illiquid-
ity when margin-setting financiers’ are unsure whether price changes are due to fundamental
news or to liquidity shocks and fundamentals have time-varying volatility. This happens
when a liquidity shock leads to price volatility, which raises the financier’s expectation about
future volatility. Figure 1 shows that margins did increase empirically for S&P 500 futures
during the liquidity crises of 1987, 1990, and 1998. We denote margins as “destabilizing” if
they can increase in illiquidity, and note that anecdotal evidence from prime brokers suggests
that margins often behave this way.
The model also shows that margins can, in contrast, decrease in illiquidity and thus be
“stabilizing.” This happens when financiers know that prices diverge due to temporary mar-
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ket illiquidity and know that liquidity will be improved shortly as complementary customers
arrive. This is because a current price divergence from fundamentals provide a “cushion”
against future adverse price moves, making the speculator’s position less risky in this case.
In summary, our model predicts that margins depend on market conditions and are more
destabilizing in specialized markets in which financiers cannot easily distinguish fundamental
shocks from liquidity shocks or predict when a trade converges.
Turning to the implications for market liquidity, we first show that, as long as speculator
capital is so abundant that there is no risk of hitting the funding constraint, market liquidity
is naturally at its highest level and is insensitive to marginal changes in capital and mar-
gins. However, when speculators hit their capital constraints — or risk hitting their capital
constraints over the life of a trade — then they reduce their positions and market liquidity
declines.
When margins are destabilizing or speculators have large existing positions, there can
be multiple equilibria and liquidity can be fragile. In one equilibrium, markets are liquid,
leading to favorable margin requirements for speculators, which in turn helps speculators
make markets liquid. In another equilibrium, markets are illiquid, resulting in larger margin
requirements (or speculator losses), thus restricting speculators from providing market liquid-
ity. Importantly, any equilibrium selection has the property that small speculator losses can
lead to a discontinuous drop of market liquidity. This “sudden dry-up” or fragility of market
liquidity is due to the fact that with high levels of speculator capital, markets must be in a
liquid equilibrium, and, if speculator capital is reduced enough, the market must eventually
switch to a low-liquidity/high-margin equilibrium.1 The events following the Russian default
in 1998 are a vivid example of fragility of liquidity since a relatively small shock had a large
impact. Compared to the total market capitalization of the US stock and bond markets, the
losses due to the Russian default were minuscule but, as Figure 1 shows, caused a shiver in
world financial markets.
1Fragility can also be caused by asymmetric information on the amount of trading by portfolio insurance
traders (Gennotte and Leland (1990)), and by losses on existing positions (Chowdhry and Nanda (1998)).
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Further, when markets are illiquid, market liquidity is highly sensitive to further changes
in funding conditions. This is due to two liquidity spirals: first, a “margin spiral” emerges
if margins are increasing in market illiquidity because a reduction in speculator wealth low-
ers market liquidity, leading to higher margins, tightening speculators’ funding constraint
further, and so on. For instance, Figure 1 shows how margins gradually escalated within
a few days after Black Monday in 1987. Second, a “loss spiral” arises if speculators hold
a large initial position that is negatively correlated with customers’ demand shock. In this
case, a funding shock increases market illiquidity, leading to speculator losses on their initial
position, forcing speculators to sell more, causing a further price drop, and so on.2 These
liquidity spirals reinforce each other, implying a larger total effect than the sum of their
separate effects. Paradoxically, liquidity spirals imply that a larger shock to the customers’
demand for immediacy leads to a reduction in the provision of immediacy during such stress
times. Consistent with our predictions, Mitchell, Pulvino, and Pedersen (2007) find signifi-
cant liquidity-driven divergence of prices from fundamentals in the convertible bond markets
after capital shocks to the main liquidity providers, namely convertible arbitrage hedge funds.
Our model also provides a natural explanation for the commonality of liquidity across as-
sets since shocks to speculators’ funding constraint affect all securities. This may help explain
why market liquidity is correlated across stocks (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000),
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Huberman and Halka (2001)), and across stocks and bonds
(Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005)). In support of the idea that commonality is
driven at least in part by our funding-liquidity mechanism, Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrah-
manyam (2005) find that “money flows ... account for part of the commonality in stock
and bond market liquidity.” Moreover, their finding that “during crisis periods, monetary
expansions are associated with increased liquidity” is consistent with our model’s prediction
that the effects are largest when traders are near their constraint. Coughenour and Saad
2The loss spiral is related to the multipliers that arise in Grossman (1988), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Chowdhry and Nanda (1998), Xiong (2001), Kyle and Xiong (2001), Gromb and
Vayanos (2002), Morris and Shin (2004), Plantin, Sapra, and Shin (2005) and others. To our knowledge, our
paper is the first to model the margin spiral and the interaction between the two multipliers.
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(2004) provide further evidence of the funding-liquidity mechanism by showing that the co-
movement in liquidity among stocks handled by the same NYSE specialist firm is higher than
for other stocks, commonality is higher for specialists with less capital, and decreases after a
merger of specialists.
Next, our model predicts that market liquidity declines as fundamental volatility in-
creases, which is consistent with the empirical findings of Benston and Hagerman (1974) and
Amihud and Mendelson (1989).3 The model implies that the liquidity differential between
high-volatility and low-volatility securities increases as speculator capital deteriorates — a
phenomenon sometimes referred to as “flight to quality”or “flight to liquidity.”According to
our model, this happens because a reduction in speculator capital induces traders to provide
liquidity mostly in securities that do not use much capital (low volatility stocks since they have
lower margins). Hence, illiquid securities are predicted to have more liquidity risk. Recently,
Hendershott, Moulton, and Seasholes (2006) test these predictions using inventory positions
of NYSE specialists as a proxy for funding liquidity. Their findings support our hypotheses
that market liquidity of high volatility stocks is more sensitive to changes in inventory shocks
and that this is more pronounced at times of low funding liquidity. Moreover, Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) document empirical evidence consistent
with flight to liquidity and the pricing of this liquidity risk.
Market-making firms are often net long the market. For instance, Ibbotson (1999) reports
that security brokers and speculators have median market betas in excess of one. Therefore,
capital constraints are more likely to be hit during market downturns, and this, together
with the mechanism outlined in our model, helps to explain why sudden liquidity dry-ups
occur more often when markets decline and why liquidity co-moves more during downturns.
Following our model’s prediction, Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2005) document that
co-movements in liquidity indeed are higher during large negative market moves.
3The link between volatility and liquidity is shared by the models of Stoll (1978), Grossman and Miller
(1988), and others. What sets our theory apart is that this link is connected with margin constraints. This
leads to testable differences since, according to our model, the link is stronger when speculators are poorly
financed, and high-volatility securities are more affected by speculator wealth shocks — our explanation of
flight to quality.
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Finally, the risk alone that the funding constraint becomes binding limits speculators’
provision of market liquidity. Our analysis shows that speculators’ optimal (funding) risk
management policy is to maintain a “safety buffer.” This affects initial prices, which increase
in the covariance of future prices with future shadow costs of capital (i.e., with future funding
illiquidity).
Our paper is related to several literatures.4 Most directly related are the models with
margin-constrained traders: Grossman and Vila (1992) and Liu and Longstaff (2004) derive
optimal strategies in a partial equilibrium with a single security; Chowdhry and Nanda (1998)
focus on fragility due to dealer losses; and Gromb and Vayanos (2002) derive a general equi-
librium with one security and study welfare and liquidity provision. Our paper contributes
to the literature by considering the simultaneous effect of margin constraints on multiple se-
curities and by examining the nature of those margin constraints. Stated simply, the existing
theoretical literature uses a fixed or decreasing margin constraint — say $5,000 per contract
— and studies what happens when trading losses cause agents to hit this constraint, whereas
we study how market conditions lead to changes in the margin requirement itself — e.g., an
increase from $5,000 to $15,000 per futures contract as happened in October 1987 — and the
resulting feedback effects between margins and market conditions.
We proceed as follows. First, we describe the real-world funding constraints for the main
liquidity providers, namely market makers, banks, and hedge funds (Section 1). We then
describe the model (Section 2) and derive our four main new results: (i) margins increase
with market illiquidity when financiers cannot distinguish fundamental shocks from liquidity
shocks and fundamentals have time-varying volatility (Section 3); (ii) this makes margins
destabilizing, leading to sudden liquidity dry ups and margin spirals (Section 4); (iii) liquidity
4Market liquidity is the focus of market microstructure (Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1981, 1983), Kyle
(1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Grossman and Miller (1988)), and is related to the limits of arbitrage
(DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2002)). Funding liquidity is examined in corporate finance (Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Holmstro¨m and Tirole
(1998,2001)) and banking (Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Allen and Gale (1998, 2004, 2005)). Funding and
collateral constraints are also studied in macroeconomics (Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Lustig (2004)), and general equilibrium with incomplete markets (Geanakoplos (1997, 2003)). Finally
recent papers consider illiquidity with constrained traders (Attari, Mello, and Ruckes (2005), Bernardo and
Welch (2004), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005), Eisfeldt (2004), Morris and Shin (2004), and Weill (2004)).
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crises simultaneously affect many securities, mostly risky high-margin securities, resulting in
commonality of liquidity and flight to quality (Section 5); and (iv) liquidity risk matters
even before speculators hit their capital constraints (Section 6). Finally, we outline how our
model’s new testable predictions may be helpful for a novel line of empirical work that links
measures of speculators’ funding conditions to measures of market liquidity (Section 7).
1 Margins, Haircuts and Capital Constraints
A central element of our paper is the capital constraints that the main providers of market
liquidity face. To set the stage for our model, we review these institutional features for
securities firms such as hedge funds, banks’ proprietary trading desks, and market makers.
(Readers mainly interested in our theory can skip to Section 2.)
1.1 Funding Requirements for Hedge Funds
We first consider the funding issues faced by hedge funds since they have relatively simple
balance sheets and face little regulation. A hedge fund’s capital consists of its equity capital
supplied by the partners, and possible long-term debt financing that can be relied upon
during a potential funding crisis. Since a hedge fund is a partnership, the equity is not
locked into the firm indefinitely, as in a corporation. The investors (that is, the partners) can
withdraw their capital at certain times, but — to ensure funding — the withdrawal is subject
to initial lock-up periods and general redemption notice periods before specific redemption
dates (typically at least a month, often several months or even years). A hedge fund usually
does not issue long-term unsecured bonds, but some (large) hedge funds manage to obtain
debt financing in the form of medium-term bank loans or in the form of a guaranteed line of
credit.5 Recently, some hedge funds have even raised capital by issuing bonds or permanent
equity (e.g., see The Economist 1/27/2007, page 75).
5A line of credit may have a “material adverse change” clause or other covenants subject to discretionary
interpretation of the lender. Such covenants imply that the line of credit may not be a reliable source of
funding during a crisis.
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Hedge funds’ main source of leverage is collateralized borrowing financed by the hedge
fund’s prime broker(s). The prime brokerage business is opaque since the terms of the financ-
ing are subject to negotiation and are hidden to outsiders. We describe stylized financing
terms and, later, we discuss caveats.
If a hedge fund buys at time t a long position of xjt > 0 shares of a security j at price p
j
t ,
it has to come up with xjtp
j
t dollars. The security can, however, be used as collateral for a
new loan of, say, ljt dollars. The difference between the price of the security and the collateral
value is denoted as the margin requirement mj+t = p
j
t − ljt . Hence, this position uses xjtmj+t
dollars of the fund’s capital. The collateralized funding implies that the capital use depends
on margins, not notional amounts.
The margins on fixed income securities and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives are set
through a negotiation between the hedge fund and the prime broker that finances the trade.
The margins are typically set so as to make the loan almost risk free for the broker, that is,
such that it covers the largest possible adverse price move with a certain degree of confidence
(i.e., it covers the Value-at-Risk).6
If the hedge fund wants to sell short a security, xj < 0, then the fund asks one of its brokers
to locate a security that can be borrowed, and then the fund sells the borrowed security.
Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2002) describe in detail the institutional arrangements of
shorting. The broker keeps the proceeds of the short sale to be able to repurchase the
security if the hedge fund fails and, additionally, requires that the hedge fund posts a margin
mj−t that covers the largest possible adverse price move with a certain degree of confidence.
In the U.S., margins on equities are subject to Regulation T, which stipulates that non-
brokers/dealers must have an initial margin (downpayment) of 50% of the market value of
the underlying stock, both for new long and short positions. Hedge funds can, however,
circumvent Regulation T by, for instance, organizing the transaction as a total return swap,
6An explicit equation for the margin is given by (6) in Section 2. Often brokers also take into account
the delay between the time a failure by the hedge fund is noticed, and the time the security is actually sold.
Hence, the margin of a one-day collateralized loan depends on the estimated risk of holding the asset over a
time period that is often set as five to ten days.
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which is a derivative that is functionally equivalent to buying the stock.
The margin on exchange traded futures (or options) is set by the exchange. The principle
for setting the margin for futures or options is the same as that described above. The margin
is set such as to make the exchange almost immune to the default risk of the counterparty,
and hence riskier contracts have larger margins.
A hedge fund must finance all of its positions, that is, the sum of all the margin require-
ments on long and short positions cannot exceed the hedge fund’s capital. In our model, this
is captured by the following key equation, which must be satisfied at any time t:
∑
j
(
xj+t m
j+
t + x
j−
t m
j−
t
)
≤Wt, (1)
Here, xj+t ≥ 0 is the size of a long position and xj−t ≥ 0 is the size of a short position, so that
the actual position is xjt = x
j+
t − xj−t .
At the end of the financing period, time t+1, the position is “marked-to-market,” which
means that the hedge fund receives any gains (or pays any losses) that have occurred be-
tween t and t + 1, that is, the fund receives xjt (p
j
t+1 − pjt ) and pays interest on the loan at
the funding rate. If the trade is kept on, the broker keeps the margin to protect against
losses going forward from time t + 1. The margin can be adjusted if the risk of the collat-
eral has changed, unless the counterparties have contractually fixed the margin for a certain
period. Stock exchanges and self-regulatory organizations (e.g., NASD) also impose main-
tenance/continuation margins for existing stock positions. For example, the NYSE and the
NASD require that investors maintain a minimum margin of 25% for long stock positions
and 30% for short stock positions.
Instead of posting risk-free assets (cash), a hedge fund can also post risky assets to cover
his margin. However, in this case a “haircut” is subtracted from the risky asset’s market
value to account for the riskiness of the collateral. The haircut is equivalent to a margin
since the hedge fund could alternatively have used the risky security to raise cash and then
could use this cash to cover the margins for asset j. We therefore use the terms margins and
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haircuts interchangeably.
We have described how funding constraints work when margins and haircuts are set
separately for each security position. It is, however, sometimes possible to “cross-margin”,
i.e. to jointly finance several trades that are part of the same strategy. This leads to a lower
total margin if the risks of the various positions are partially offsetting. For instance, much of
the interest rate risk is eliminated in a “spread trade” with a long position in one bond and a
short position in a similar bond. Hence, the margin/haircut of a jointly financed spread trade
is smaller than the sum of the margins of the long and short bonds. For a strategy that is
financed jointly, we can reinterpret security j as such a strategy. Prime brokers compete by,
among other things, offering low margins and haircuts — a key consideration for hedge funds
— which means that it is becoming increasingly easy to finance more and more strategies
jointly. In the extreme, one can imagine a joint financing of a hedge fund’s total position
such that the “portfolio margin” would be equal to the maximum portfolio loss with a certain
confidence level. Currently, it is often not practical to jointly finance a large portfolio. This
is because a large hedge fund finances its trades using several brokers; both a hedge fund
and a broker can consist of several legal entities (possibly located in different jurisdictions);
certain trades need separate margins paid to exchanges (e.g., futures and options) or to other
counterparties of the prime broker (e.g., securities lenders); prime brokers may not have
sufficiently sophisticated models to evaluate the diversification benefits (e.g., because they
don’t have enough data on the historical performance of newer products such as CDOs);
and because of other practical difficulties in providing joint financing. Further, if the margin
requirement relies on assumed stress scenarios in which the securities are perfectly correlated
(e.g., due to predatory trading as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005)), then the portfolio
margin constraint coincides with position-by-position margins.
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1.2 Funding Requirements for Banks
A bank’s capital consists of equity capital plus its long-term borrowings (including credit lines
secured from individual or syndicates of commercial banks), reduced by assets that cannot be
readily employed (e.g., goodwill, intangible assets, property, equipment, and capital needed
for daily operations), and further reduced by uncollateralized loans extended by the bank to
others (see e.g., Goldman Sachs 2003 Annual Report). Banks also raise money using short-
term uncollateralized loans such as commercial paper and promissory notes, and, in the case
of commercial banks, demand deposits. These sources of financing cannot, however, be relied
on in times of funding crises since lenders may be unwilling to continue lending, and therefore
this short-term funding is often not included in measures of capital.
The financing of a bank’s trading activity is largely based on collateralized borrowing.
Banks can finance long positions using collateralized borrowing from corporations, other
banks, insurance companies, and the Federal Reserve Bank, and can borrow securities to
shortsell from, for instance, mutual funds and pension funds. These transactions typically
require margins which must be financed by the bank’s capital as captured by the funding
constraint (1).
The financing of a bank’s proprietary trading is more complicated than that of a hedge
fund, however. For instance, banks may negotiate zero margins with certain counterparties,
and banks can often sell short shares held in house, that is, held in a customer’s margin
account (in “street name”) such that the bank does not need to use capital to borrow the
shares externally. Further, a bank receives margins when financing hedge funds (i.e., the
margin is negative from the point of view of the bank). However, often the bank wants to
pass on the trade to an exchange or another counterparty and hence has to pay a margin to
the exchange. In spite of these caveats, we believe that in times of stress, banks face margin
requirements and are ultimately subject to a funding constraint in the spirit of (1). For
instance, Goldman Sachs (2003 Annual Report, page 62) states that it seeks to maintain net
capital in excess of total margins and haircuts that it would face in periods of market stress
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plus the total draws on unfunded commitments at such times. In addition, Goldman Sachs
recognizes that it may not have access to short-term borrowing during a crisis, that margins
and haircuts may increase during such a crisis, and that counterparties may withdraw funds
at such times.
Banks must also satisfy certain regulatory requirements. Commercial banks are subject
to the Basel accord, supervised by the Federal Reserve system for US banks. In short, the
Basel accord of 1988 requires that a bank’s “eligible capital” exceeds 8% of the “risk-weighted
asset holdings,” which is the sum of each asset holding multiplied by its risk weight. The
risk weight is 0% for cash and government securities, 50% for mortgage-backed loans, and
100% for all other assets. The requirement posed by the 1988 Basel accord corresponds
to Equation (1) with margins of 0%, 4%, and 8%, respectively. In 1996, the accord was
amended, allowing banks to measure market risk using an internal model based on portfolio
VaRs rather than using standardized risk weights.
U.S. broker-speculators, including banks acting as such, are subject to the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC)’s “net capital rule” (SEC Rule 15c3-1). This rule stipulates,
among other things, that a broker must have a minimum “net capital,” which is defined as eq-
uity capital plus approved subordinate liabilities minus “securities haircuts” and operational
charges. The haircuts are set as security-dependent percentages of the market value. The
standard rule requires that the net capital exceeds at least 623% (15:1 leverage) of aggregate
indebtedness (broker’s total money liabilities) or alternatively 2% of aggregate debit items
arising from customer transactions. This constraint is similar in spirit to (1).7 As of August
20, 2004, SEC amended (SEC Release No. 34-49830) the net capital rule for Consolidated
Supervised Entities (CSE)’s such that CSE’s may, under certain circumstances, use their
internal risk models to determine whether they fulfill their capital requirement.
7Let L be the lower of 6 2
3
% of total indebtedness or 2% of debit items and hj the haircut for security j;
then the rule requires that L ≤W −Pj hjxj , that is, Pj hjxj ≤W − L.
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1.3 Funding Requirements for Market Makers
There are various types of market-making firms. Some are small partnerships, whereas oth-
ers are parts of large investment banks. The small firms are financed in a similar way to
hedge funds in that they rely primarily on collateralized financing; the funding of banks was
described in Section 1.2.
Certain market makers, such as NYSE specialists, have an obligation to make a market
and a binding funding constraint means that they cannot fulfill this requirement. Hence,
avoiding the funding constraint is especially crucial for such market makers.
Market makers are in principle subject to the SEC’s net capital rule (described in Sec-
tion 1.2), but this rule has special exceptions for market makers. Hence, market makers’ main
regulatory requirements are those imposed by the exchange on which they operate. These
constraints are often similar in spirit to (1).
2 Model
Setup. The economy has J risky assets, traded at times t = 0, 1, 2, 3. At time t = 3, each
security j pays off vj , a random variable defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P). There is no
aggregate risk and the risk-free interest rate is normalized to zero, so the fundamental value
of each stock is its conditional expected value of the final payoff vjt = Et
[
vj
]
. Fundamental
volatility has an autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) structure. Specifically,
vjt evolves according to
vjt+1 = v
j
t +∆v
j
t+1 = v
j
t + σ
j
t+1ε
j
t+1 , (2)
where all εjt are i.i.d. across time and assets with a standard normal cumulative distribution
function Φ with zero mean and unit variance, and the volatility σjt has dynamics
σjt+1 = σ
j + θj |∆vjt |, (3)
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where σj , θj ≥ 0. A positive θj implies that shocks to fundamentals increase future volatility.
There are three groups of market participants: “customers” and “speculators” trade assets
while “financiers” finance speculators’ positions. The group of customers consists of three
risk-averse agents. At time 0, customer k = 0, 1, 2 has a cash holding of W k0 bonds and
zero shares, but finds out that he will experience an endowment shock of zk = {z1,k, ..., zJ,k}
shares at time t = 3, where z is a random variables such that the aggregate endowment shock
is zero,
∑2
k=0 z
j,k = 0.
The basic liquidity problem arises because customers may arrive sequentially, which gives
rise to order imbalance. In particular, customer k only begins trading at time t = k with
probability a, while all customers start trading at once at t = 0 with probability (1 − a).
Before a customer arrives at the marketplace, his demand is ykt = 0. After he arrives,
he chooses his security position ykt in order to maximize his exponential utility function
U(W k3 ) = − exp{−ρW k3 } over final wealth. WealthW kt , including the value of the anticipated
endowment shock of zk shares, evolves according to
W kt+1 =W
k
t +
(
pt+1 − pt
)′ (ykt + zk) . (4)
The total demand shock of customers who have arrived in the market at time t is denoted
by Zt :=
∑t
k=0 z
k.
The early customers’ trading need is accommodated by speculators who provide liquid-
ity/immediacy. Speculators are risk-neutral and maximize expected final wealth W3. Spec-
ulators face the constraint that the total margin on their position xt cannot exceed their
capital Wt: ∑
j
(
xj+t m
j+
t + x
j−
t m
j−
t
)
≤Wt , (1)
where xj+t ≥ 0 and xj−t ≥ 0 are the positive and negative parts of xjt = xj+t −xj−t , respectively,
andmj+t ≥ 0 andmj−t ≥ 0 are the dollar margin on long and short positions, respectively. The
institutional features related to this key constraint are discussed in detail above in Section 1.
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Speculators start out with an initial cash position ofW0 and zero shares, and their wealth
evolves according to
Wt =Wt−1 +
(
pt − pt−1
)′ xt−1 + ηt , (5)
where ηt is an independent wealth shock arising from other activities, e.g., the speculators’
investment banking arm. If a speculator loses all his capital at time t, Wt ≤ 0, he can no
longer invest because of the margin constraint (1), i.e. he must choose xt = 0. We let his
utility in this case be ϕtWt, where ϕt ≥ 0. Limited liability corresponds to ϕt = 0, and a
proportional bankruptcy cost (e.g., monetary, reputational, or opportunity costs) corresponds
to ϕt > 0. We focus on the case in which ϕ2 = 1, that is, negative consumption equal to
time-2 the dollar loss, and we discuss ϕ1 in Section 6. Our results would be qualitatively the
same with other bankruptcy assumptions.8
The financier sets the margins to limit his counterparty credit risk. Specifically, the
financier ensures that the margin is large enough to cover the position’s pi-value-at-risk (where
pi is a nonnegative number close to zero, e.g., 1%):
pi = Pr(−∆pjt+1 > mj+t | Ft) (6)
pi = Pr( ∆pjt+1 > m
j−
t | Ft) . (7)
Equation (6) means that the margin on a long position m+ is set such that price drops
larger than the margin only happen with a small probability pi. Similarly, (7) means that
price increases larger than the margin on a short position only happen with small probability.
Clearly, the margin is larger for more volatile assets. The margin depends on financiers’ infor-
mation set Ft. We consider two important benchmarks: “informed financiers” who know the
fundamental value and the liquidity shocks z, Ft = σ{z,v0, . . . ,vt,p0, . . . ,pt, η1, . . . , ηt}, and
“uninformed financiers” who only observe prices, Ft = σ{p0, . . . ,pt}. This margin specifica-
8We could allow the speculators to raise new capital as long as this takes time. Indeed, the model would
be the same if the speculators could raise capital only at time 2 (and in this case we need not assume that
the customers’ endowment shocks zj aggregate to zero).
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tion is motivated by the real-world institutional features described in Section 1. Theoretically,
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show how credit rationing can be due to adverse selection and moral
hazard in the lending market, and Geanakoplos (2003) considers endogenous contracts in a
general-equilibrium framework of imperfect commitment.
We let Λjt be the (signed) deviation of the price from fundamental value
Λjt = p
j
t − vjt , (8)
and we define our measure of market illiquidity as the absolute amount of this deviation,
|Λjt |. We consider competitive equilibria of the economy:
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a price process pt such that (i) xt maximizes the speculators’
expected final profit subject to the margin constraint (1), (ii) each ykt maximizes k-customers
expected utility after their arrival at the marketplace and is zero beforehand, (iii) margins are
set according to the VaR specification (6), and (iv) markets clear, xt +
∑2
k=0 y
k
t = 0.
Outline of Equilibrium. We derive the optimal strategies for customers and speculators
using dynamic programming, starting from time 2, and working backwards. A customer’s
value function is denoted Γ and a speculator’s value function is denoted J . At time 2,
customer k’s problem is
Γ2(W k2 , p2, v2) = max
yk2
−E2[e−γWk3 ] (9)
= max
yk2
−e−γ(E2[Wk3 ]− γ2 V ar2[Wk3 ]) (10)
which has the solution
yj,k2 =
vj2 − pj2
γ(σj3)2
− zj,k (11)
Clearly, since all customers are present in the market at time 2, the unique equilibrium
is p2 = v2. Indeed, when the prices are equal to fundamentals, the aggregate customer
demand is zero,
∑
k y
j,k
2 = 0, and the speculator also has a zero demand. We get the
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customer’s value function Γ2(W k2 , p2 = v2, v2) = −e−γW
k
2 , and the speculator’s value function
J2(W2, p2 = v2, v2) =W2.
The equilibrium before time 2 depends on whether the customers arrive sequentially or
all at time 0. If all customers arrive at time 0, then the simple arguments above show that
pt = vt at any time t = 0, 1, 2.
We are interested in the case with sequential arrival of the customers such that the
speculators’ liquidity provision is needed. At time 1, customers 0 and 1 are present in the
market, but customer 2 has not arrived yet. As above, customer k = 0, 1 has a demand and
value function of
yj,k1 =
vj1 − pj1
γ(σj2)2
− zj,k (12)
Γ1(W k1 , p1, v1) = − exp
−γ
W k1 +∑
j
(vj1 − pj1)2
2γ(σj2)2
 (13)
At time 0, customer k = 0 arrives in the market and maximizes E0[Γ1(W k1 , p1, v1)].
At time t = 1, if the market is perfectly liquid so that pj1 = v
j
1 for all j, then the
speculator is indifferent among all possible positions x1. If some securities have p1 6= v1,
then the risk-neutral speculator invests all his capital such that his margin constraint binds.
The speculator optimally trades only in securities with the highest expected profit per dollar
used. The profit per dollar used is (vj1 − pj1)/mj+1 on a long position and −(vj1 − pj1)/mj−1 on
a short position. A speculator’s shadow cost of capital, denoted φ1, is 1 plus the maximum
profit per dollar used as long as he is not bankrupt:
φ1 = 1 +max
j
(
max{v
j
1 − pj1
mj+1
,
−(vj1 − pj1)
mj−1
}
)
, (14)
where the margins for long and short positions are set by the financier as described in the
next section. If the speculator is bankrupt W1 < 0 then φ1 = ϕ1. Each speculator’s value
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function is therefore
J1(W1, p1, v1, p0, v0) =W1φ1 . (15)
At time t = 0, the speculator maximizes E0[W1φ1] subject to his capital constraint (1).
The equilibrium prices at times 1 and 0 do not have simple expressions. However, af-
ter having derived the margin conditions, we characterize several important properties of
these prices, which illuminates the connection between market liquidity, |Λ|, and speculators’
funding situation.
3 Margin Setting and Liquidity (Time 1)
We want to determine the financiers’ margin, m1, at time 1, both in the case of informed
and uninformed financiers. The financier sets the margin such that it covers the position’s
value-at-risk, knowing that prices equal the fundamental values in the next period, p2 = v2.
If informed financiers know the fundamental values v1 (or, equivalently, know the demand
shocks z0, z1), they are aware of Λ1. Since Λ2 = 0, margins on long positions at t = 1 are set
according to
pi = Pr(−∆pj2 > mj+1 | F1)
= Pr(−∆vj2 + Λj1 > mj+1 | F1) (16)
= 1− Φ
(
mj+1 − Λj1
σj2
)
,
which implies that
mj+1 = Φ
−1 (1− pi)σj2 + Λj1 (17)
= σ¯j + θ¯|∆vj1|+ Λj1
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where we define
σ¯j = σjΦ−1 (1− pi) (18)
θ¯ = θ Φ−1 (1− pi) . (19)
The margin on a short position can be derived similarly.
Proposition 1 (Stabilizing Margins and the Cushioning Effect) When the financier
is informed about the fundamental value and knows that prices will equal fundamentals in the
next period t = 2, then the margins on long and short positions are, respectively,
mj+1 = max{σ¯j + θ¯|∆vj1|+ Λj1, 0} (20)
mj−1 = max{σ¯j + θ¯|∆vj1| − Λj1, 0} (21)
The more prices are below fundamentals Λj1 < 0, the lower is the margin on a long position
mj+1 , and the more prices are above fundamentals Λ
j
1 > 0, the lower is the margin on a short
position mj−1 . Hence, in this case illiquidity reduces margins for speculators who buy low and
sell high.
The margins are reduced by illiquidity because the speculator is expected to profit when
prices return to fundamentals at time 2, and this profit “cushions” the speculators from
losses due to fundamental volatility. Thus, we denote the margins set by informed financiers
at t = 1 as stabilizing margins.
Stabilizing margins are an interesting benchmark, and they are hard to escape in a the-
oretical model. However, real-world liquidity crises are often associated with increases in
margins, not decreases. To capture this, we assume that fundamentals follow an ARCH pro-
cess and turn to the case of a financier who is uninformed about the current fundamental
so that he must set his margin based on the observed prices p0 and p1. This is in general
a complicated problem since the financier needs to filter out the probability that a liquidity
shock occurred, and the values of z0 and z1. The expression becomes simple however, if the
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financier’s prior probability of a liquidity shock is small so that he finds it likely that pjt = v
j
t ,
implying a common margin mj1 = m
j+
1 = m
j−
1 for long and short positions in the limit:
Proposition 2 (Destabilizing Margins) When the financier is uninformed about the fun-
damental value, then as a→ 0 the margins on long and short positions approach
mj1 = σ¯
j + θ¯|∆pj1| = σ¯j + θ¯|∆vj1 +∆Λj1| . (22)
Margins are increasing in price volatility and illiquidity shocks can increase margins.
Intuitively, since liquidity risk tends to increase price volatility, and since an uninformed
financier may interpret price volatility as fundamental volatility, this increases margins.9
Equation (22) corresponds closely to real-world margin setting, which is primarily based on
volatility estimates from past price movements. Equation (22) shows that illiquidity increases
margins when the liquidity shock ∆Λj1 has the same sign as the fundamental shock ∆v
j
1 or
is greater in magnitude, but margins are reduced if the liquidity shock counterbalances a
fundamental move. We denote the phenomenon that margins can increase as illiquidity rises
by destabilizing margins. As we will see next, the information available to the financier —
i.e., whether margins are stabilizing or destabilizing — has important implications for the
equilibrium.
4 Fragility and Liquidity Spirals (Time 1)
This section discusses liquidity spirals and fragility — the property that a small change in
fundamentals can lead to a large jump in liquidity. For simplicity we illustrate this with a
single security J = 1.
Fragility. We say that liquidity is fragile if the equilibrium price pt(ηt, vt) cannot be chosen
to be continuous in the exogenous shocks, namely ηt and ∆vt. Fragility arises when the excess
9In the analysis of time 0, we shall see that margins can also be destabilizing when price volatility signals
future liquidity risk (not necessarily fundamental risk).
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demand for shares xt +
∑1
k=0 y1 can be non-monotonic in the price. While under “normal”
circumstances, a high price leads to a low total demand (i.e., excess demand is decreasing),
binding funding constraints along with destabilizing margins (margin effect) or speculators’
losses (loss effect) can lead to an increasing demand curve.
It is natural to focus on stable equilibria. An equilibrium is stable if a small negative
(positive) price perturbation leads to excess demand (supply), which, intuitively, “pushes”
the price back up (down) to its equilibrium level.
Proposition 3 (Fragility) (i) With informed financiers, the market is fragile at time 1 if
speculators’ position x0 is large enough.
(ii) With uninformed financiers, the market is fragile at time 1 if x0 large enough or if the
ARCH parameter, θ, is large enough and the financiers’ prior probability, a, of a liquidity
shock is small enough.
Numerical Example. We illustrate how fragility arises due to destabilizing margins or
dealer losses by way of a numerical example. We consider the more interesting (and arguably
more realistic) case in which the financiers are uninformed, and we choose parameters as
follows.
The fundamental value has ARCH volatility parameters σ = 5 and θ = 0.3, which implies
clustering of volatility. The price in the previous time period was p0 = 130, the aggregate
demand shock of the customers who have arrived at time 1 is Z1 = z0 + z1 = 40, and the
customers’ risk aversion is γ = 0.025. The speculators’ have an initial position of x0 = 0
and a cash wealth of W1 = 750. Finally, the financier uses a VaR with pi = 1% and a → 0,
leading to a margin requirement of m = σ¯ + θ¯|∆p1| = 2.326(5 + 0.3|∆p1|).
We first show how speculators’ choose their optimal time-1 position x1, and how the
equilibrium price p1 depends on the exogenous shocks to their wealth η1 and on the security’s
fundamentals ∆v1. Panel A of Figure 2 illustrates how the speculators’ demand x1 and the
customers’ supply (i.e., the negative of the customers’ demand as per Equation (12)) depend
on the price p1 when the fundamental value is v1 = 120 < p0 = 130 and the speculators’
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wealth shock is η1 = 0. Customers’ supply is given by the upward sloping line since, naturally,
their supply is greater when the price is higher. Customers supply Z1 = 40 shares, namely
the shares that they anticipate receiving at time t = 3, when the market is perfectly liquid,
p1 = v1 (i.e. illiquidity is |Λ1| = 0). For lower prices, they supply fewer shares.
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Figure 2: Speculator Demand and Customer Supply. This figure illustrates how mar-
gins can be destabilizing when financiers are uninformed and the fundamentals have volatility
clustering. Specifically, a speculator’s margin constraint means that his position must be in-
side the four dashed lines (the “hyperbolic star”). The solid curve is the speculators’ optimal
demand. The upward sloping line is the customers’ supply, that is, the negative of their
demand. In Panel A the speculators experience a zero wealth shock, η1 = 0, while in Panel B
they face a negative wealth shock of η1 = −150, otherwise everything is the same. In Panel
A, perfect liquidity p1 = v1 = 120 is one of two stable equilibria, while in Panel B the unique
equilibrium is illiquid.
The speculators must satisfy their margin constraints |x1| ≤ W1/(σ¯ + θ¯|∆p1|), which
graphically means that their demand must be inside the “hyperbolic star” defined by the
four (dashed) hyperbolas. At the price p1 = p0 = 130, the margin is smallest and hence the
constraint is most relaxed. As p1 departs from p0 = 130, margins increase and speculators
become more constrained — the horizontal distance between two hyperbola shrinks.
The speculators’ demand curve is given by the solid line in the figure: For p1 = v1 = 120,
the security’s expected return is zero and the speculator is indifferent between all his possible
positions on the horizontal line. For price levels p1 < v1 below this line, the risk neutral
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speculators want to buy the asset, x1 > 0, and their demand is constrained by the lower
right side of the star. Similarly, for prices above v1, speculators short the asset, x1 < 0, and
their demand is limited by the left side of the star. Interestingly, the speculators’ demand
is upward sloping for prices below v1 = 120 because a larger price drop ∆p1 increases the
financiers’ estimate of fundamental volatility and consequently of margins.
There are two stable equilibria: a perfect liquidity equilibrium with price p1 = v1 =
120 and an illiquid equilibrium with a price of about 86.5 (and an uninteresting unstable
equilibrium between the two stable ones).
Panel B of Figure 2 shows the same plot as Panel A, but with a negative wealth shock
to speculators of η1 = −150 instead of η1 = 0. In this case, perfect liquidity with p1 = v1
is no longer an equilibrium since the speculator cannot fund a large enough position. The
unique equilibrium is highly illiquid because of the speculators’ lower wealth and, importantly,
because of endogenously higher margins.
This “disconnect” between the perfect-liquidity equilibrium and the illiquid equilibrium
and the resulting fragility is illustrated more directly in Figure 3. Panel A plots the equilib-
rium price correspondence for different exogenous funding shocks η1 (with fixed ∆v1 = −5)
and shows that a marginal reduction in funding cannot always lead to a smooth reduction in
market liquidity. Rather, there must be a level of funding such that an infinitesimal drop in
funding leads to a discontinuous drop in market liquidity.
Panel B of Figure 3 plots the equilibrium price correspondence for different realizations
of the fundamental shock ∆v1 (with fixed η1 = 0) and shows the same form of discontinu-
ity for adverse fundamental shocks to v1. The discontinuity with respect to ∆v1 is most
easily understood in conjunction with Figure 2 Panel A. As ∆v1 falls, the horizontal line
of speculator demand shifts downward within the star, and the customer supply line moves
downward. As a result, the perfect liquidity equilibrium vanishes. Panel B also reveals the
interesting asymmetry that negative fundamental shocks lead to larger price movements than
corresponding positive shocks (for Z1 := z0 + z1 > 0).
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Figure 3: Fragility due to Destabilizing Margins. The figure shows the equilibrium price
correspondence as a function of the speculators’ wealth shock η1 (Panel A) and of fundamental
shocks ∆v1 (Panel B). The margins are destabilizing since financiers are uninformed and
fundamentals exhibit volatility clustering. The discontinuity of the equilibrium prices reflects
fragility in liquidity since a small shock can lead to a disproportionately large price effect.
Fragility can also arise because of shocks to customer demand or volatility. For instance,
the price correspondence p1 is discontinuous in the customers’ shock Z1 since a larger Z1 shifts
customers’ supply in Figure 2 down such that the perfect liquidity equilibrium vanishes. When
this happens, a marginally larger demand for liquidity by customers leads, paradoxically, to
a drastic reduction of liquidity supply by the speculators.
So far we have considered speculators with zero initial positions, x0 = 0. If x0 > 0,
then lower prices lead to losses for the speculators, and graphically this means that the
constraints in the “hyperbolic star” tighten (i.e., the gap between the hyperbolas narrows)
at low prices. Because of this “loss effect,” the discontinuous price drop associated with the
illiquid equilibrium is even larger.
The discontinuity in prices driven by destabilizing margins and dealer losses can help
to explain the sudden market liquidity dry-ups observed in many markets. For example,
Russia’s default in 1998 was in itself only a trivial wealth shock relative to global arbitrage
capital. Nevertheless, it had a large effect on liquidity in global financial markets, consistent
with our fragility result that a small wealth shock can push the equilibrium over the edge.
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Liquidity Spirals. This subsection shows that once the economy enters an illiquid equi-
librium, market liquidity becomes highly sensitive to shocks. We identify two amplification
mechanisms, a “margin spiral” due to increasing margins as speculator financing worsens,
and a “loss spiral” due to escalating speculator losses. Figure 4 illustrates these “liquidity
funding
problems
less
trading
higher
margins
losses on 
existing positions
lower
market liquidity
Figure 4: Liquidity Spirals
spirals”: A shock to speculator capital, η1 < 0, forces speculators to provide less market liq-
uidity, which increases the price impact of the customer demand pressure. With uninformed
financiers and a positive ARCH effect θ > 0, the resulting price swing increases financiers’
estimate of the fundamental volatility and, hence, increases the margin, thereby worsening
speculator funding problems even further, and so on, leading to a “margin spiral.” Similarly,
increased market illiquidity can lead to losses on speculators’ existing positions, worsening
their funding problem and so on, leading to a “loss spiral.” Mathematically, the spirals can
be expressed as follows:
Proposition 4
(i) If speculators’ capital constraint is slack then the price p1 is equal to v1 and insensitive
to local changes in speculator wealth.
(ii) (Liquidity Spirals) In a stable illiquid equilibrium with selling pressure from customers,
25
Z1, x1 > 0, the price sensitivity to speculator wealth shocks η1 is
∂p1
∂η1
=
1
2
γ(σ2)
2m
+
1 +
∂m+1
∂p1
x1 − x0
(23)
and with buying pressure from customers, Z1, x1 < 0,
∂p1
∂η1
=
−1
2
γ(σ2)
2m
−
1 +
∂m−1
∂p1
x1 + x0
. (24)
A margin spiral arises if ∂m
+
1
∂p1
< 0 or ∂m
−
1
∂p1
> 0, which happens with positive probability if
speculators are uninformed and a is small enough. A loss spiral arises if speculators’ previous
position is in the opposite direction as the demand pressure x0Z1 > 0.
This proposition is intuitive. Imagine first what happens if speculators face a wealth
shock of $1, margins are constant, and speculators have no inventory x0 = 0. In this case,
the speculator must reduce his position by 1/m1. Since the slope of each of the two customer
demand curves is10 1/(γ (σ2)
2), we get a total price effect of 1/( 2
γ(σ2)
2m1).
The two additional terms in the denominator imply amplification or dampening effects
due to changes in the margin requirement and to profit/losses on the speculators’ existing
positions. To see that, recall that for any k > 0 and l with |l| < k, it holds that 1k−l =
1
k +
l
k2
+ l
2
k3
+ ...; so with k = 2
γ(σ2)
2m1 and l = −∂m
±
1
∂p1
x1 ± x0, each term in this infinite
series corresponds to one loop around the circle in Figure 4. The total effect of the changing
margin and speculators’ positions amplifies the effect if l > 0. Intuitively, if e.g. Z1 > 0,
then customer selling pressure is pushing down the price, and ∂m
+
1
∂p1
< 0 means that as prices
go down, margins increase, making speculators’ funding tighter and thus destabilizing the
system. Similarly, when customers are buying, ∂m
−
1
∂p1
> 0 implies that increasing prices leads
to increased margins, making it harder for speculators to shortsell, thus destabilizing the
system. The system is also destabilized if speculators’ lose money on their previous position
10See Equation (12).
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as prices move away from fundamentals similar to e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
Interestingly, the total effect of a margin spiral together with a loss spiral is greater than
the sum of their separate effects. This can be seen mathematically by using simple convexity
arguments, and it can be seen intuitively from the flow diagram of Figure 4.
Note that spirals can also be “started” by shocks to liquidity demand Z1, fundamentals
v1, or volatility. It is straightforward to compute the price sensitivity with respect to such
shocks. They are just multiples of ∂p1∂η1 . For instance, a fundamental shock affects the price
both because of its direct effect on the final payoff and because of its effect on customers’
estimate of future volatility — and both of these effects are amplified by the liquidity spirals.
Our analysis sheds some new light on the 1987 stock market crash, complementing the
standard culprit, portfolio insurance trading. In the 1987 stock market crash, numerous
market makers hit (or violated) their funding constraint:
“By the end of trading on October 19, [1987] thirteen [NYSE specialist] units
had no buying power”
— SEC (1988), page 4-58
Several of these firms managed to reduce their positions and continue their operations. Others
did not. For instance, Tompane was so illiquid that it was taken over by Merrill Lynch
Specialists and Beauchamp was taken over by Spear, Leeds & Kellogg (Beauchamp’s clearing
broker). Also, market makers outside the NYSE experienced funding troubles: the Amex
market makers Damm Frank and Santangelo were taken over; at least 12 OTC market makers
ceased operations; and several trading firms went bankrupt.
These funding problems were due to (i) reductions in capital arising from trading losses
and defaults on unsecured customer debt, (ii) an increased funding need stemming from
increased inventory and, (iii) increased margins. One New York City bank, for instance, in-
creased margins/haircuts from 20% to 25% for certain borrowers, and another bank increased
margins from 25% to 30% for all specialists (SEC (1988) page 5-27 and 5-28). Other banks
reduced the funding period by making intra-day margin calls, and at least two banks made
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intra-day margin calls based on assumed 15% and 25% losses, thus effectively increasing the
haircut by 15% and 25%. Also, some broker-dealers experienced a reduction in their line of
credit and – as Figure 1 shows – margins at the futures exchanges also drastically increased.
(See SEC (1988) and Wigmore (1998).)
In summary, our results on fragility and liquidity spirals imply that during “bad” times,
small changes in underlying funding conditions (or liquidity demand) can lead to sharp reduc-
tions in liquidity. The 1987 crash exhibited several of the predicted features, namely capital
constrained dealers, increased margins, and increased illiquidity.
5 Commonality and Flight to Quality (Time 1)
We now turn to the cross-sectional implications of illiquidity. Since speculators are risk-
neutral, they optimally invest all their capital in securities that have the greatest expected
profit |Λj | per capital use, i.e., per dollar margin mj , as expressed in Equation (14). That
equation also introduces the shadow cost of capital φ1 as the marginal value of an extra dollar.
The speculators’ shadow cost of capital φ1 captures well the notion of funding liquidity: a
high φ means that the available funding — from capital W1 and from collateralized financing
with margins mj1 — is low relative to the needed funding, which depends on the investment
opportunities deriving from demand shocks zj .
The market liquidity of all assets depend on the speculators’ funding liquidity, especially
for high-margin assets, and this has several interesting implications:
Proposition 5 Suppose θj is close enough to zero for all j, and financiers are either in-
formed or uninformed with probability a small enough. Then we have:
(i) (Commonality of Market Liquidity) The market illiquidities |Λ| of any two securities,
k and l, co-move,
Cov0
(
|Λk1|, |Λl1|
)
≥ 0 , (25)
and market illiquidity co-moves with funding illiquidity as measured by speculators’ shadow
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cost of capital φ1
Cov0
[
|Λk1|, φ1
]
≥ 0 . (26)
(ii) (Commonality of Fragility) Jumps in market liquidity occur simultaneously for all
assets for which speculators are marginal investors.
(iii) (Quality=Liquidity) If asset l has lower fundamental volatility than asset k, σl < σk,
then l also has lower market illiquidity,
|Λl1| ≤ |Λk1| (27)
(iv) (Flight to Quality) The market liquidity differential between high- and low-fundamental-
volatility securities is bigger when speculator funding is tight, that is, σl < σk implies that
|Λk1| increases more with a negative wealth shock to the speculator,
∂|Λl1|
∂(−η1) ≤
∂|Λk1|
∂(−η1) , (28)
if xk1 6= 0. Further, if with large enough probability xk 6= 0, then
Cov0(|Λl1|, φ1) ≤ Cov0(|Λk1|, φ1) . (29)
Numerical Example, Continued. To illustrate these cross-sectional predictions, we ex-
tend the numerical example of Section 4 to two securities. The two securities only differ in
their long-run fundamental volatility: σ¯1 = 5 and σ¯2 = 7.5. The other parameters are as
before, except that we double W1 to 1500 since the speculators now trade two securities, and
the financiers remain uninformed.
Figure 5 depicts the assets’ equilibrium prices for different values of the funding shock η1.
First note that as speculator funding tightens and our funding illiquidity measure φ1 rises,
the market illiquidity measure |Λj1| rises for both assets. Hence, for random η1, we see our
commonality in liquidity result Cov0
[|Λk1|, |Λl1|] > 0.
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Figure 5: Flight to Quality and Commonality in Liquidity. The figure plots that price
pj1 of assets 1 and 2 as functions of speculators’ funding shocks η1. Asset 1 has lower long-run
fundamental risk than asset 2, σ¯1 = 5 < 7.5 = σ¯2.
The “commonality in fragility” cannot directly be seen from Figure 5, but it is suggestive
that both assets have the same range of η1 with 2 equilibrium prices p
j
1. The intuition for this
result is the following. Whenever funding is unconstrained, there is perfect market liquidity
provision for all assets. If funding is constrained, then it cannot be the case that speculators
provide perfect liquidity for one asset but not for the other, since they always would have an
incentive to shift funds towards the asset with non-perfect market liquidity. Hence, market
illiquidity jumps for both assets exactly at the same funding level.
Our result relating fundamental volatility to market liquidity (“Quality=Liquidity”) is
reflected in p21 being below p
1
1 for any given funding level. Hence, the high-fundamental-
volatility asset 2 is always less liquid than the low-fundamental-volatility asset 1.
The graph also illustrates our result on “flight to quality.” To see this, consider the
two securities’ relative price sensitivity with respect to η1. For large wealth shocks, market
liquidity is perfect for both assets, i.e. p11 = p
2
1 = v
1
1 = v
2
1 = 120 so in this high range
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of funding, market liquidity is insensitive to marginal changes in funding. For sufficiently
small funding levels, η1 < 222, market illiquidity of both assets increases as η1 drops since
speculators must take smaller stakes in both assets. Importantly, as funding decreases, p21
decreases more steeply than p11, that is, asset 2 is more sensitive to funding declines than
asset 1. This is because speculators cut back more on the “funding-intensive” asset 2 with its
high margin requirement. The speculators want to maximize their profit per dollar margin,
|Λj |/mj and therefore |Λ2| must be higher than |Λ1| to compensate speculators for using
more capital for margin.
Both price functions exhibit a kink around η = −1086, because, for sufficiently low funding
levels, speculators put all their capital into asset 2. This is because the customers are more
eager to sell the more volatile asset 2, leading to more attractive prices for the speculators.
6 Liquidity Risk (Time 0)
In this section, we focus on t = 0 and demonstrate that (i) funding liquidity risk matters even
before margin requirements actually bind, (ii) the pricing kernel depends on future funding
liquidity, φt+1, (iii) the conditional distribution of prices p1 is skewed due to the funding
constraint, and (iv) margins m0 and illiquidity Λ0 can be positively related due to liquidity
risk even if financiers are informed.
If speculators have no dis-utility associated with negative wealth levelsW1 < 0, then they
go to their limit already at time 0. While most firms legally have limited liability, we note
that the capitalW in our model refers to pledgable capital allocated to trading. For instance,
Lehman Brothers (2001 Annual Report, page 46) states that
“the following must be funded with cash capital: Secured funding ‘haircuts,’
to reflect the estimated value of cash that would be advanced to the Company
by counterparties against available inventory, Fixed assets and goodwill, [and]
Operational cash ... ,”
Hence, if a speculator suffers a large loss on his pledgable capital such that Wt < 0, then he
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incurs monetary costs that he has to cover with his unpledgable capital like operational cash.
In addition he incurs non-monetary cost, like loss in reputation and in goodwill, that reduces
his ability to exploit future profitable investment opportunities. To capture these effects, we
let a speculators’ utility be φ1W1, where φ1 is given by the right-hand side of (14) both for
positive and negative values of W1. With this assumption, equilibrium prices at time t = 0
are such that the speculators do not trade to their constraint at time t = 0 when their wealth
is large enough.11 In fact, this is the weakest assumption that curbs the speculators’ risk
taking since it makes their objective function linear. Higher “bankruptcy costs”, like e.g.
ϕ1 = max{φ1} for W1 < 0, would lead to more cautious trading at time 0 and qualitatively
similar results.
If the speculator is not constrained at time t = 0, then the first-order condition for his
position in security j is E0[φ1(p
j
1 − pj0)] = 0. (We leave the case of a constrained time-0
speculator for the appendix.) Consequently, the funding liquidity φ1 determines the pricing
kernel for the cross section of securities:
pj0 =
E0[φ1p
j
1]
E0[φ1]
= E0[p
j
1] +
Cov0[φ1, p
j
1]
E0[φ1]
. (30)
Equation (30) shows that the price at time 0 is the expected time-1 price — which already
depends on the liquidity shortage at time-1 — further adjusted for liquidity risk in the form
of a covariance term. The liquidity risk term is intuitive: The time-0 price is lower if the
covariance is negative, that is, if the security has a low payoff during future funding liquidity
crises when φ1 is high.
The cost of hitting a funding constraint and the importance of funding-liquidity manage-
ment are illustrated by the “LTCM crisis” after the Russian default in 1998. The hedge fund
11Note that an adverse shock lowers speculator wealth at t = 1, but creates a profitable investment op-
portunity in t = 1. One might think that the latter effect provides a natural “dynamic hedge” and hence,
speculators (with a relative risk aversion coefficient larger than 1) increase their t = 0 hedging demand, which
in turn, lowers illiquidity in t = 0. However, exactly the opposite occurs in a setting with capital constraints.
Capital constraints prevent speculators from taking advantage of investment opportunities in t = 1. Hence,
speculators are reluctant to trade away the illiquidity in t = 0. In this sense, our mechanism is different from
one that is driven by risk-aversion.
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Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) had been aware of funding liquidity risk. Indeed,
they estimated that in times of severe stress, haircuts on AAA-rated commercial mortgages
would increase from 2% to 10%, and similarly for other securities (HBS Case N9-200-007(A)).
In response to this, LTCM had negotiated long-term financing with margins fixed for several
weeks on many of their collateralized loans. Other firms with similar strategies, however,
experienced increased margins. Due to an escalating liquidity spiral, LTCM could ultimately
not fund its positions in spite of its numerous measures to control funding risk and was taken
over by 14 banks in September 1998. Another recent example is the funding problems of the
hedge fund Amaranth in September 2006, which reportedly ended with losses in excess of $6
billion.
Numerical Example, Continued. To better understand funding liquidity risk, we ex-
plore the time-0 properties of our model by returning to our numerical example with one
security. We consider first an uninformed financier and later turn to an informed one.
Figure 6 depicts the price p0 and expected time-1 price E0[p1] for different initial wealth
levels, W0, for which the speculators’ funding constraint is not binding in t = 0. The figure
shows that even though the speculators are unconstrained at time 0, market liquidity provision
is limited with prices below the fundamental value of E0[v] = 140. The price is below the
fundamental for two reasons: First, the expected time-1 price is below the fundamental value
because of the risk that speculators cannot accommodate the customer selling pressure at that
time. Second, holding the security leads to losses in the states of nature when speculators
are constrained and investment opportunities are good, which makes speculators require
additional compensation for holding the asset.
The funding constraint not only affects the price level, it also introduces skewness in the
p1-distribution conditional on the sign of the demand pressure. For Z1 > 0, speculators
take long positions and, consequently, negative v1-shocks lead to capital losses with resulting
liquidity spirals. This amplification triggers a sharper price drops than the corresponding
price increase for positive v1-shocks. Figure 7 shows this negative skewness which is especially
33
600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400
135
135.5
136
136.5
137
137.5
138
138.5
139
139.5
140
W0
p 0
,
 
E[
p 1
]
Figure 6: Illiquidity at Time 0. The solid line plots the price p0 at time 0 for different
funding levels W0. The dashed line depicts E0[p1]. The difference between p0 and the
fundamental value E0[v] = 140 (dotted line) reflects illiquidity at time 0 and 1. We see that
funding constraints are important already at time 0, although the constraint is not binding
at this time for the depicted wealth levels.
pronounced for low wealth levels (although the effect is not monotone — zero dealer wealth
implies no skewness, for instance).
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Figure 7: Conditional Price Skewness. The figure shows the conditional skewness of p1
for different funding levels W0. While the funding constraint is not binding at time 0, it can
become binding at time 1, leading to large price drops due to liquidity spirals. Price increases
are not amplified, and this asymmetry results in skewness.
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For negative realizations of Z1, customers want to buy (not sell as above), and funding
constraints induce a positive skewness in the p1-distribution. The speculator return is nega-
tively skewed, as above, since it is still his losses that are amplified. This is consistent with
the casual evidence that hedge fund return indexes are negatively skewed. It also suggests
from an ex-ante point of view, i.e., prior to the realization of Z1, that funding constraints
lead to higher kurtosis of the price distribution (fat tails).
Finally, we confirm numerically that unlike at time t = 1, margins can be positively
related to illiquidity at time 0, even when financiers are fully informed. This is because of the
liquidity risk between time 0 and time 1. To see this, note that if we reduce the speculators’
initial wealth W0, then the market becomes less liquid in the sense that the price is further
from the fundamental value. At the same time, the equilibrium price in t = 1 is more volatile
and thus equilibrium margins at time 0 can actually increase.
7 Conclusion and New Testable Predictions
Our analysis provides a theoretical framework that delivers a unified explanation for a host
of stylized empirical facts. Our analysis further suggests a novel line of empirical work that
tests the model at a deeper level — namely its prediction that speculator funding is a driving
force underlying these market liquidity effects.
First, it would be of interest to empirically study the determinants of margin require-
ments, e.g., using data from futures markets or from prime brokers. Our model suggests
that both fundamental volatility and liquidity-driven volatility affects margins. Empirically,
fundamental volatility can be captured using price changes over a longer time period, and the
total fundamental and liquidity-based volatility is captured by short-term price changes as in
the literature on variance ratios (see, e.g., Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997)). Our model
predicts that, in markets where it is harder for financiers to be informed, margins depend
on the total fundamental and liquidity-based volatility. In particular, in times of liquidity
crisis, margins increase in such markets, and, more generally, margins should co-move with
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illiquidity in the time series and in the cross section.12
Second, our model suggests that an exogenous shock to speculator capital should lead
to a reduction in market liquidity. Hence, a clean test of the model would be to identify
exogenous capital shocks such as an unconnected decision to close down a trading desk, a
merger leading to reduced total trading capital, or a loss in one market unrelated to the
fundamentals of another market, and then study the market liquidity and margin around
such events.
Third, the model implies that the effect of speculator capital on market liquidity is highly
non-linear: a marginal change in capital has a small effect when speculators are far from their
constraints, but a large effect when speculators are close to their constraints.
Fourth, the model suggests that a cause of the commonality in liquidity is that the
speculators’ shadow cost of capital is a driving state variable. Hence, a measure of speculator
capital tightness should help explain the empirical comovement of market liquidity. Further
our result “commonality of fragility” suggests that especially sharp liquidity reductions occur
simultaneously across several assets.
Fifth, the model predicts that the sensitivity of margins and market liquidity to speculator
capital is larger for securities that are risky and illiquid on average. Hence, the model suggests
that a shock to speculator capital would lead to a reduction in market liquidity through a
spiral effect that is stronger for illiquid securities.
Sixth, speculators are predicted to have negatively skewed returns since, when they hit
their constraints, they make significant losses because of the endogenous liquidity spirals,
and, in contrast, their gains are not amplified when prices return to fundamentals. This
leads to conditional skewness and unconditional kurtosis of security prices.
Finally, our analysis suggests that central banks can help mitigate market liquidity prob-
lems by controlling funding liquidity. If a central bank is better than the typical financiers
of speculators at distinguishing liquidity shocks from fundamental shocks, then the central
12One must be cautious with the interpretation of the empirical results related to changes in Regulation T
since this regulation may not affect speculators but affects the demanders of liquidity, namely the customers.
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bank can convey this information and urge financiers to relax their funding requirements —
as the Federal Reserve Bank of New York did during the 1987 stock market crash. Central
banks can also improve market liquidity by boosting speculator funding conditions during a
liquidity crisis, or by simply stating the intention to provide extra funding during times of cri-
sis, which would loosen margin requirements immediately as financiers’ worst-case scenarios
improve.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2. These results follow from the calculations in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3. We prove the proposition for Z1 > 0, implying p1 ≤ v1 and
x1 ≥ 0. The complementary case is analogous. To see how the equilibrium depends on
the exogenous shocks, we first combine the equilibrium condition x1 = −
∑1
k=0 y
k
1 with the
speculator funding constraint to get
m+1
(
Z1 − 2
γ(σ2)2
(v1 − p1)
)
≤ b0 + p1x0 + η1 (31)
that is,
m+1
(
Z1 − 2
γ(σ2)2
(v1 − p1)
)
− p1x0 − b0 ≤ η1 (32)
For η1 large enough, this inequality is satisfied for p1 = v1, that is, it is a stable equilibrium
that the market is perfectly liquid. For η1 low enough, the inequality is violated for p1 =
2v1
γ(σ2)2
− Z1, that is, it is an equilibrium that the speculator is in default. We are interested
in intermediate values of η1. If the left-hand-side of (32) is increasing in p1 then p1 is a
continuously increasing function of η1, implying no fragility with respect to η1.
Fragility arises if the left-hand-side of (32) can be decreasing p1. Intuitively, this expres-
sion measures speculator funding needs at the equilibrium position, and fragility arises if the
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funding need is greater when prices are lower, that is, further from fundamentals. (This can
be shown to be equivalent to a non-monotonic excess demand function.)
When the financier is informed, the left-hand-side of (32) is
(σ¯ + θ¯|∆v1|+ p1 − v1)
(
Z1 +
2
γ(σ2)2
(p1 − v1)
)
− p1x0 − b0 (33)
Since the first product is a product of two positive increasing functions of p1, the entire
expression decreases in p1 only if x0 is large enough.
When the financier is uninformed and a = 0, the left-hand-side of (32) is
(σ¯ + θ¯|∆p1|)
(
Z1 +
2
γ(σ2)2
(p1 − v1)
)
− p1x0 − b0 (34)
When p1 < p0, |∆p1| = p0 − p1 decreases in p1 and, if θ¯ is large enough, this can make the
entire expression decreasing. Also, the expression is decreasing if x0 is large enough.
It can be shown that the price cannot be chosen continuously in η1 when the left-hand-side
of (32) can be decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 4. When the funding constraint binds, we use the implicit function
theorem to compute the derivatives. Using that y1 is given by (12), the equilibrium condition
x1 = −y1, the fact that the speculator funding constraint binds in an illiquid equilibrium,
and that v1 − p1 > 0 when Z1 > 0, we have
m+1
(
Z1 − 2
γ(σ2)2
(v1 − p1)
)
= b0 + p1x0 + η1 . (35)
We differentiate this expression to get
∂m+1
∂p1
∂p1
∂η1
(
Z1 − 2
γ(σ2)2
(v1 − p1)
)
+m+1
2
γ(σ2)2
∂p1
∂η1
=
∂p1
∂η1
x0 + 1 , (36)
which leads to Equation (23) after rearranging. The case of Z1 < 0 (i.e., Equation (24)) is
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analogous.
Finally, spiral effects happen if one of the last two terms in the denominator of the
right-hand side of Equations (23)-(24) is negative. (The total value of the denominator is
positive by definition of a stable equilibrium.) When the speculator is informed, ∂m
+
1
∂p1
= 1
and ∂m
−
1
∂p1
= −1 using Proposition 1. Hence, in this case margins are stabilizing.
If the speculators are uninformed and a approaches 0, then using Proposition 2 we have
that ∂m
+
1
∂p1
= ∂m
+
1
∂Λ1
approaches −θ¯ < 0 for v1 − v0 + Λ1 − Λ0 < 0 and ∂m
−
1
∂p1
= ∂m
−
1
∂Λ1
approaches
θ¯ > 0 for v1 − v0 + Λ1 − Λ0 > 0. This means that there is a margin spiral with positive
probability. The case of a loss spiral is immediately seen to depend on the sign on x0.
Proof of Proposition 5. We first consider the equation that characterizes a constrained
equilibrium. When there is selling pressure from customers, Zj1 > 0, it holds that
|Λj1| = −Λj1 = vj1 − pj1 = min{φ1mj+1 ,
γ(σj2)
2
2
Zj1 } , (37)
and if customers are buying, Zj1 < 0, we have
|Λj1| = Λj1 = pj1 − vj1 = min{φ1mj−1 ,
γ(σj2)
2
2
(−Zj1) } . (38)
Using the equilibrium condition xj1 = −
∑
k y
j,k
1 , Equation (12) for y
j,k
1 , the speculators’
funding condition becomes
∑
Zj1>
2φ1m
j+
1
γ(σ
j
2)
2
mj+1
(
Zj1 −
2φ1m
j+
1
γ(σj2)2
)
+
∑
−Zj1>
2φ1m
j−
1
γ(σ
j
2)
2
mj−1
(
−Zj1 −
2φ1m
j−
1
γ(σj2)2
)
=
∑
j
xj0p
j
1 + b0 + η1
(39)
where the margins are evaluated at the prices solving (37)–(38). When φ1 approaches infinity,
the left-hand-side of (39) becomes zero, and when φ1 approaches zero, the left-hand-side
approaches the capital needed to make the market perfectly liquid. As in the case of one
security, there can be multiple equilibria and fragility (Proposition 3). On a stable equilibrium
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branch, φ1 increases as η1 decreases.
Of course, the equilibrium shadow cost of capital φ1 is random since η1,∆v11, . . . ,∆v
J
1 are
random. To see the commonality in liquidity, we note that |Λj | is increasing in φ1 for each
j = k, l. To see this, consider first the case Zj1 > 0. When the financiers are uninformed,
a = 0, and θj = 0, then mj+1 = σ¯
k, and, therefore, Equation (37) shows directly that |Λj1|
increases in φ1 (since the minimum of increasing functions is increasing). When financiers
are informed and θj = 0 then mj+1 = σ¯
k +Λj1, and, therefore, Equation (37) can be solved to
be |Λj1| = min{ φ11+φ1 σ¯j ,
γ(σk2 )
2
2 Z
k
1 }, which increases in φ1. Similarly, Equation (38) shows that
|Λj | is increasing in φ1 when Zj1 < 0.
Now, since |Λj | is increasing in φ1 and does not depend on other state variables under these
conditions, Cov
(|Λk(φ)|, |Λl(φ)|) ≥ 0 because any two functions which are both increasing in
the same random variable are positively correlated.
To see part (ii) of the proposition, note that, for all j, |Λj | is a continuous function of φ1,
which is locally insensitive to φ1 if and only if the speculator is not marginal on security j
(i.e., if the second term is Equation (37) or (38) attains the minimum). Hence, |Λj | jumps if
and only if φ1 jumps.
To see part (iii), we write illiquidity using Equations (37)–(38) as
|Λj1| = min{φ1mj,sign(Z
j
1)
1 ,
γ(σj2)
2
2
|Zj1 | } . (40)
Hence, using the expression for the margin, if the financier is uninformed and θj = a = 0,
then
|Λj1| = min{φ1σ¯j1 ,
γ(σj2)
2
2
|Zj1 | } (41)
and, if the financier is informed and θj = 0, then
|Λj1| = min{
φ1
1 + φ1
σ¯j1 ,
γ(σj2)
2
2
|Zj1 | } . (42)
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In the case of an uninformed financier as in (41), we see that, if xk1 6= 0,
|Λk1| = φ1σ¯k1 ≥ φ1σ¯l1 ≥ |Λl1| (43)
and, if |Zk1 | ≥ |Z l1|,
|Λk1| = min{φ1σ¯k1 ,
γ(σi2)
2
2
|Zk1 | } ≥ min{φ1σ¯l1 ,
γ(σi2)
2
2
|Z l1| } = |Λl1| . (44)
With an informed financier, it is seen that |Λk1| ≥ |Λl1| using the same arguments.
For part (iv) of the proposition, we use that
∂|Λj1|
∂(−η1) =
∂|Λj1|
∂φ1
∂φ1
∂(−η1) (45)
Further, ∂φ1∂(−η1) ≥ 0 and, from Equations (41)–(42), we see that
∂|Λk1 |
∂φ1
≥ ∂|Λl1|∂φ1 . The result that
Cov(Λk, φ) ≥ Cov(Λl, φ) now follows from Lemma 1 below.
Lemma 1 Let X be a random variable and gi, i = 1, 2, be weakly increasing functions X,
where g1 has a larger derivative than g2, that is, g′1(x) ≥ g′2(x) for all x. Then,
Cov[X, g1(X)] ≥ Cov[X, g2(X)] (46)
Proof. For i = 1, 2 we have
Cov[X, gi(X)] = E [(X −E[X])gi(X)] (47)
= E
[
(X − E[X])(
∫ X
E[X]
g′i(y)dy)
]
. (48)
The latter expression is a product of two terms that always have the same sign. Hence, this
is higher if g′i is larger.
Liquidity Risk (Time 0). Section 6 focuses on the case of speculators who are uncon-
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strained at t = 0. When a speculator’s problem is linear and he is constrained is time 0, then
he invests only in securities with the highest expected profit per capital use, where profit is
calculated using the pricing kernel φi1/E0[φ
i
1]. In this case, his time-0 shadow cost of capital
is
φi0 = E0[φ
i
1]
1 + max
j

E0[
φi1
E0[φi1]
pj1]− pj0
m+0
,−
E0[
φi1
E0[φi1]
pj1]− pj0
m−0

 (49)
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